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Torts - Prenatal Injury
.. . to comprehend why a life interest in a residuary trust which at
testator's death amounted to $200,000 and a qualifying power to appoint
$100,000 out of it or a life interest in such a trust and a qualifying
power to appoint all but $100,000 out of it, do not relate to a 'specific
portion,' namely, $100,000, quite as much as if the testator had used a
fraction or a percentage with respect to the power over corpus.'2
Furthermore, the court recognized that Congress used the phrase "specific
portion" and not "fractional or percentile share" and that it had not
indicated a policy that deductibility of a "specific portion" should be
governed by the possibility that the spouse's portion will change in value
relatively more or less than the dearly nonqualifying part'"
In effect, the court held that a trust will qualify for the marital de-
duction to the extent that the surviving spouse is entitled to a specific
sum out of the entire trust, provided the other conditions requisite to
the marital deduction are met. 4 No portion of the trust would have
qualified for the marital deduction if the invasion provision for the
youngest daughter had not been limited to a specific amount. 5
It is submitted that the court was justified in its holding. The
marital deduction provision was designed to equalize the tax treatment
of decedents in common-law states with decedents in community property
states.'" In Gelb, the court took another step toward equalization by
giving a liberal construction to the enactment.
MILAN D. KARLAN
TORTS - PRENATAL INJURY - RECOVERY ALLOWED
Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962)
Ever since the initial attack upon the citadel of non-liability for pre-
natal torts in the case of Bonbrest v. Kotz,' the trend toward allowing
recovery for prenatal injuries has been ". . so definite and marked so
as to leave no doubt that this will be the law of the future in the United
12. Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 550 (2d Cir. 1962).
13. The Commissioner had also argued that a specific dollar amount does not meet the
statutory test in that there is no certainty that the value of the entire corpus will be the same
on the date of the surviving spouse's death as it was on the date of the decedent's death and,
therefore, it fails to meet the regulation's proviso that the surviving spouse's "share must
reflect its proportionate share of the increment or decline in the whole of the property in trust."
Ibid.
14. See notes 6 and 7 supra and accompanying text.
15. Hull, Fractional Test for Marital Deduction Trust Upset by CA-2, 16 J. TAXATION
222, 224 (1962). If the invasion provision was for an indefinite amount, it would have
precluded determination of the portion of the trust reserved to the surviving spouse. Ibid.
The court ruled that the surviving spouse's qualifying power was over the entire corpus less
the present value of $5,000 multiplied by the joint expectancy of the surviving spouse and
the youngest daughter, which can be actuarially determined.
16. See generally Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family - The Revenue Act of 1948, 61
HARV. L. Riv. 1097 (1948).
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States."2  In a recent Washington case,8 the court allowed recovery by
aa infant who was born with cerebral palsy. This condition resulted
from the negligence of the physician in caring for the mother both dur-
ing pregnancy and in the subsequent delivery. The court concluded that
the more enlightened position allows recovery for prenatal injuries, and
although this type of action ". . . is prone to present difficult causation
issues .... Difficulty of proof does not prevent the assertion of a legal
right."4
Today, most jurisdictions allow a foetus subsequently born alive to
recover for prenatal injuries.' The theory of jurisdictions denying re-
covery is a remnant of the common-law rule that an unborn child, being
a part of the mother, is not a person in being. Thus, in the latter juris-
dictions it is reasoned that the unborn child is owed no duty, and it is
one in whom a cause of action cannot accrue because of its legal nonex-
istence.6 The catalyst in this overwhelming about-face of jurisdictions
rejecting their former common-law non-liability position and adopting
this new type of tort liability ".... is the current state of medical knowl-
edge on the point of the separate existence of a foetus."7
1. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). Bonbrest is the first American decision allowing re-
covery. The Canadian Supreme Court in an earlier case allowed a foetus subsequently born
alive to recover for its prenatal injuries. See Montreal Tramways Co. v. Leveille, [1933] Can.
Sup. Ct. 456, [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
2. PROSSER, TORTS § 36 at 175 (2d ed. 1955).
3. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835 (Wash. 1962). One judge concurred
in the result because the evidence of proximate cause was so overwhelming. However, he
agreed with the two dissenting judges that there was an improper use of defendant's deposition,
which he had repudiated, and that it was error to use textbooks to establish medical facts. Id.
at 841.
4. Id. at 838.
5. Of the jurisdictions which have expressly ruled on this point, twenty-one states and the
District of Columbia allow recovery. In five other states it is unlikely that the non-liability
rule will withstand another attack. See Annots., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953); 10 A.LR.2d 1059
(1950). Michigan and Wisconsin have all but overruled their past decisions denying re-
covery and have strongly intimated that they will do so when the issue is next presented. See
LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960); Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins.
Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959).
6. See Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901); Lewis v. Steves Sash & Door
Co., 177 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943). This minority position was epitomized by a
Texas court when it said that a reasonable man ". . . reckons life from the time of birth. His
conscious care and solicitude are for the expectant mother and not for the unborn child apart
from her." Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 359, 78 S.W.2d 944,
949 (1935). But see Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 357, 102 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1951),
where the court said: "To hold, as a matter of law, that no viable foetus has any separate
existence which the law will recognize is for the law to deny a simple and easily demonstrable
fact. This child, when injured, was in fact, alive and capable of being delivered and of re-
maining alive, separate from its mother. We agree with the dissenting Justice below that
'To deny the infant relief in this case is not only a harsh result, but its effect is to do reverence
to an outmoded, timeworn fiction not founded on fact and within the common knowledge
untrue and unjustified.'"
7. Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 272, 164 A.2d 93, 95 (1960). In PATTEN, HUMAN
EMBRYOLOGY 181 (2d ed. 1953), it is stated: "... a new individual must be regarded as
commencing at the moment of fertilization."
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A point upon which the court did not dwell, in the instant case, was
whether the injury must occur when the foetus is viable.' Six states,
and possibly a seventh,1" now allow a foetus subsequently born alive to
recover against a tortfeasor whether or not it was viable at the time of
the injury. This seems to be the more rational view, for the duty owed
a viable foetus should be no greater than that owed a non-viable one."
Furthermore, since there can be a comparatively wide difference of
opinion as to the moment viability occurs,"2 the arbitrary viability rule
causes injustices in borderline cases, unless the child is born immediately
after the injury.
In law, there is an implicit recognition of an interest in a child
being born alive. The law gives a foetus subsequently born alive a cause
of action for the death of its father even though the foetus was not yet
viable when the death occurred.'" Similarly, a child en ventre sa mere '4
at the time of the death of the intestate, and subsequently born alive,
is regarded as living for the purposes of the statutes of descent and dis-
tribution.' 5
8. A viable foetus is one which, had it been born at the time of the injury, could live apart
from its mother. The period of fetal development is divided into three stages. The first
two weeks are called the ovum period. From the third to the fifth week is the embryonic
period in which certain rudiments of organs appear. The remainder of the prenatal life is
the fetal period in which a definite human shape is acquired. Usually the foetus will become
viable sometime between the twentieth and twenty-eighth week of gestation. WLLIAMS,
OBSTERMCS 182-85 (11th ed. Eastman 1956).
9. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956); Sana v.
Brown, 183 N.E.2d 187 (Ill. Ct. App. 1962); Daley v. Meier, 33 Ill. App. 2d 218, 178
N.E.2d 691 (1961); Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958); Smith v.
Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960); Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542, 125
N.Y.S.2d 696 (1953); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960); Von Elbe v.
Studebaker-Packard Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.2d 635 (C.P. 1958).
10. In Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 441, 79 A.2d 550, 561 (1951), the court
first espoused the viability theory but concluded by noting that "... as soon as it becomes
alive it has rights which it can exercise. When it becomes alive is a medical question to be
determined in each case according to the facts." From the opinion it is not clear whether the
word "alive" means the time of conception or the time of viability.
11. Duty determines one's conduct before acting. Use of the viability rule necessitates a
determination of one's duty after the act is completed, for the actor has no outward indicia of
whether the unborn is viable or not. In effect, the viability rule does violence to fundamental
tort concepts, for it applies one's duty retrospectively instead of prospectively, and one will
not know whether his negligent act is actionable until a determination of viability is made.
12. In some states it is sixteen weeks. See e.g., Biegun v. State, 206 Ga. 618, 58 S.E.2d 149
(1950); Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 276, 164 A.2d 93, 97 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
In another state it is anytime from six to eight months. See Cooper v. Blandc, 39 So. 2d 352
(La. Ct. App. 1923). Others hold that viability occurs when the child "quickens," i.e., when
the mother first feels the child's movements. See, e.g., Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael &
Sons, 208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d
550 (1951).
13. LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960). See Quinlan v. Welch,
23 N.Y. Supp. 963 (Sup. Ct. 1893), aff'd, 141 N.Y. 158, 36 N.E. 12 (1894).
14. Literally translated, it means "in the mother's womb." BLACK, LAw DIcroNARY (4th
ed. 1951).
15. 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1127 (3d ed. 1939). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 29 (1961):
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The argument of those advocating abrogation of the viability rule
is that the foetus should not be treated as a legal person, but rather as
a separate entity or human being from the moment of conception, having
a potential personality which is not realized until birth. At birth liability
becomes complete so that injuries incurred prior to birth are subject to
a conditional liability so far as the child is concerned. Thus, if the per-
sonality is not achieved, there is no liability because there was no damage
to a legal person.'"
The argument of those who would deny recovery because of the po-
tentialities of fraudulent claims is casuistic. The argument fails to dis-
tinguish between the right to institute suit and the subsequent ability to
prove the allegations. The first should not be denied because the latter
might not be susceptible of proof.
The crux of the problem is proof of causation. Though such proof
may be difficult, 7 scrutiny by a sedulous court will prevent any fraud.
With the present advanced state of medical knowledge, there is no logical
reason why the viability rule should become another example of "... . the
power of a sonorous phrase to command uncritical acceptance [which!
has often been encountered in the law."'18
Considering the other legal rights of the non-viable child, 9 it be-
comes a question of whether those rights should be deemed more im-
portant than the right to be compensated for being born deformed and
debilitated through the negligence of another. Repudiation of the via-
bility rule vitiates the medico-legal limbo in which it is uncertain whether
the foetus could live separately from its mother.
PAUL A. MANCINO
"A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed an existing person, so far as may be
necessary for its interests in the event of its subsequent birth ......
16. Difficulty of proving the extent of damages is one factor which adversely affects the
rights of recovery for the wrongful death of a foetus in the early stages of its development.
"Considering the highly speculative nature of the pecuniary value of an unborn child [born
dead], even if viable, it is apparent that practically everything that could be recovered in an
action for the death of an unborn child can now be recovered by the mother in connection
with her own claim for general damages." Norman v. Murphy, 124 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99,
268 P.2d 178, 180 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954). But cf. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F. Supp. 56 (N.D.
Iowa 1960), and Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959), where
actions for the wrongful deaths of unborn viable children subsequently stillborn were upheld.
17. This will allay the objection that an over-sympathetic jury will grant relief where the
proof of causation is, at most, fragmentary. See, e.g., Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8
Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959), where the plaintiff child failed to show by clear
convincing evidence that its prenatal injuries were caused by the defendant's negligence. See
also Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 274, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
18. Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033 (1936).
19. See notes 13-14, sapra and accompanying text.
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